Introduction

41
Behavioral epidemiology -the study of human behavioral responses to infectious disease circulation -has 42 been receiving an increasing amount of research attention over the last two decades ( occurs through the trade of infected birds, susceptible coops being contaminated through contact with 129 traders transporting infected poultry (Supplementary Information 1B) . These two mechanisms are the 130 ones commonly considered as maintaining the circulation of HPAI in countries where the disease is 131 endemic (21). In equation (1), note the ̅̅̅ parameter in the second summation corresponding to trade-132 based transmission; an increased sell rate increases the trade-based force of infection (FOI), as poultry are 133 being moved into the trader network more quickly (Supplementary Information 1B) . 134
The basic reproduction number, when ̅ = 1, ̅ = 0 and all farmers apply the same depopulation 135
Economic model 138 6
At the individual coop level, a profit optimization takes place. It is assumed that the owner of coop 139 maximizes income generated by the poultry flock in coop i. This income is denoted : 140
142
(2) 143 144 with ∈ [0, 1] the probability that coop i is vaccinated, > 0 the sell rate of healthy (either susceptible 145 or vaccinated) flocks, and > 0 the sell rate of infected flocks. The parameters on the right-hand side 146 include , the farm-level force of infection, the parameter ≥ 0 as the unit sale price of poultry meat 147 extracted from healthy birds, and γ the unit replacement cost of flocks (i.e. the purchase of day-old chicks). 148
Without loss of generality, we assume = 1, and γ is a fraction of c. The parameter ∈ [0, 1] is the 149 probability that an infected flock is detected as infected at the time of sale, and ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion 150 decrease in sale price for an infected bird. The product is hereafter referred to as the penalty. We 151 have ∈ [0, 1] as the vaccination cost, defined as a fraction of . is a function relating the sell rate to 152 the carcass weight of slaughtered poultry (Supplementary Information 1A) . In the remainder of the 153 manuscript, is considered to be the FOI scaled to ∅ −1 ; in other words, λ -1 represents the number of poultry 154 cohorts cycles that take place before a flock is infected. If λ -1 < 1, the rate and individual-flock probability 155 of infection are very high. Income flow and all other costs are expressed per growing period ∅ −1 . 156 A farmer sets his own vaccination status and sell rates ( and ) . At the population level, stable 157 strategy sets {̂,̂,̂} are considered to be game-theoretical stable equilibria if they fulfill the criteria of 158 evolutionary stability (22) . Meanwhile the marginal opportunity cost function of poultry farming is 159 considered linear (Supplementary Information 1C) and the fraction of coops that are populated is 160 assumed to be: 161 162
where ̅ is the average utility across all coops as defined by equation (2) and a constant coefficient. The 165 individual-coop parameter ≥ 0 is the probability that coop is populated with poultry, and the linear 166 coefficient > 0 describes the sensitivity of poultry production to changes in income flow. 167 168
Results
169
Optimal poultry depopulation rates and epidemiological properties of the system 170
The optimal value of , by maximizing individual utility in equation ( Information 2) . Thus, infected poultry flocks will either be sold 174 when fully grown so that their total revenue can be maximized (this occurs under conditions of a high FOI 175 or low penalty), or they will be sold immediately upon noticing an infection in order to repopulate the coop 176 with a healthy flock (this occurs under conditions of a low FOI or a high penalty). Because of this 177 dichotomous behavior in the sell rate, we allow for two behaviors D and ∅, where D corresponds to 178 immediate depopulation upon infection and ∅ represents the "null behavior" of waiting until poultry are 179 fully grown before selling the flocks irrespective of infection status (Figure 1 ). Given that a coop is 180 populated and not vaccinated, the individual probability that farmer i opts for behavior D is . 
Stability of farmers' strategies and consequences for disease control 221
There is a substantial qualitative difference between poultry producer communities where poultry trade 222 alone cannot sustain viral circulation ( < 1) (Figure 3 ) and those where it can ( > 1) (Figure 4) . 223
When trade-maintained endemicity is absent ( < 1), the incentive created by a penalty on infected 224 poultry allows the depopulation strategy to establish (leading to a stable disease-free equilibrium (DFE)) 225 when either the penalty is sufficiently high or 0 is sufficiently low. In the presence of trade-maintained 226 endemicity ( > 1), the depopulation behavior will persist (0 < ̅ < 1) with a low 0 and intermediate 227 penalty, or fix ( ̅ = 1) with a high enough penalty, but neither of these scenarios are associated with a 228 stable DFE, as a higher ̅ increases the FOI. 229
In the absence of trade-maintained endemicity, depopulation behavior in the population is self-230 reinforcing: as ̅ increases, the FOI drops, and the payoff to the depopulation strategy increases as it 231 becomes less likely that a farmer's subsequent flock will experience infection. This explains the bistability 232 and hysteresis observed in the system with respect to changes in the penalty (Figure 3) . A high penalty is 233 necessary to eradicate the disease when avian influenza is endemic, but the DFE is maintained when the 234 penalty is subsequently reduced. 235
In the presence of trade-maintained endemicity, increased adoption of the depopulation behavior is 236 self-defeating: as ̅ increases, the FOI increases as traders become more likely to contract the infection, and 237 the depopulation strategy's payoff decreases as the restocking of a coop with a new flock is more likely to 238 lead to reinfection. In this case the mixed strategies ( , ∅) and (D, ) can both be evolutionarily stable, 239 depending on 0 and the size of the penalty (Figure 4) . In the mixed (D, V) strategy, depopulators can be 240 seen as free riders generating perverse epidemiological effects: their depopulation behavior increases in 241 payoff as the number of vaccinators increases, but adopting depopulation behavior (over the null behavior 242 ∅) increases overall disease transmission via the poultry trading network. For the mixed strategy ( , ∅), an 243 increased number of depopulators leads to increased FOI, which decreases the payoff of the depopulation 244 strategy (Figure 4) . In other words, the first depopulator in a 'pure ∅' strategy perceives a benefit as the 245 FOI is low, but the marginal payoff decreases as the depopulation behavior is adopted more widely, because 246 more depopulators leads to an increased FOI. 247
Vaccination alone cannot maintain a disease-free state since the payoff of vaccination declines as 248 the FOI drops, as demonstrated previously (2, 24). However, the decrease of FOI due to the vaccination of 249 a fraction of the coops incentivizes the rapid depopulation of unvaccinated infected coops, provided the 250 penalty is sufficiently high ( > + ). In the absence of trade-maintained endemicity, this synergistic 251 effect between vaccination and fast depopulation can maintain the disease-free state, even for very high 252 values of 0 , as the presence of this fast depopulating behavior among the non-vaccinees breaks the 253 transmission chain (Figure 3) . In the case of trade-maintained endemicity, the same synergistic effect 254 maintains an endemic equilibrium -at the game-theoretic evolutionary stable strategy where vaccinators 255 and depopulators co-exist -at which the FOI (equal to ) is independent of the individual transmission 256 coefficients and the price penalty (Figure 4) . 257
Generally, the penalty only affects the revenue of farmers with the null behavior ∅ (Figure 1) . 258
Thus, as long as ̅ (1 − ̅ )(1 − ̅ ) > 0 (i.e. all or part of the farmers implement ∅), increasing the penalty 259 disincentives the population of coops with poultry (i.e. decreases ̅ ) and, in turn, decreases the FOI, since 260 the disease transmission is partly density-dependent. However, when all farmers are either vaccinators or 261 depopulators, their revenue is not affected by penalty and the system is irresponsive to changes in penalty 262 
Discussion
284
In a multi-player game where a community of farmers seek to maximize their income, we found that the 285 presence of inter-farm poultry trading networks has the largest qualitative effect on the system's behavior. 286
With low levels of trade-based disease transmission, it is possible to incentivize either depopulation alone 287 or a combination of depopulation and vaccination such that the disease is pushed to an eradication state. 288
With high levels of trade-based disease transmission, adoption of depopulation behavior increases the FOI 289 on poultry traders, and the disease cannot be eradicated. Vaccination does reduce transmission in this 290 scenario, but the lower overall FOI caused by increased vaccination leads to depopulators free-riding on 291 this lower FOI, resulting in an increase of the FOI on traders specifically. As a result, the depopulation 292
behavior cannot be avoided because it is more attractive than vaccination when the FOI is low enough (but 293 not zero). When trade-based transmission alone can sustain endemicity, the disease cannot be eradicated 294 because depopulation persists. 295
The relevance of the game-theoretical stability to epidemiological-economic systems relies on the 296 assumption of perfect mobility of players: it is assumed that in the long run, actors initially implementing 297 a suboptimal strategy either switch to the optimal one (through adaptation or imitation) or quit the market 298 (i.e. leave their coops unpopulated). This assumption might hold in the context of poultry farming in the 299 developing countries of Southeast Asia, as they are characterized by limited institutional regulation and few 300 barriers to entrance and exit of the sector (25-27). Note that, as the system is subject to the economic and 301 ecological changes affecting HPAI dynamics (fluctuation in market prices and climatic variables) (28), 302 stable equilibriums remain theoretical and should be interpreted as states towards which the system tends 303 to converge. 304
These results highlight the importance of trade-based disease transmission and modulation of the 305 timing of sale -two real features of smallholder livestock systems -on the epidemiological-economic 306 equilibria of avian influenza circulating in a network of profit-maximizing farmers. Results of a sociological 307 survey in Vietnam suggest that fast depopulation is one of the behavioral responses of farmers to HPAI, as 308 respondents reported an increase in poultry sales during epidemic periods (15). The economic context of 309 poultry farming in some endemic countries is favorable to depopulation in response to disease infection: 310 chick and finished poultry are traded with limited equipment (motorcycle for transportation, storage of 311 poultry at home or in enclosures of live bird markets) (29-31) which limits transaction costs associated with 312 the sale and replacement of flocks. Moreover, the limited sanitary controls and flexibility of the trade 313 networks allow the sale of sick and/or young birds and their use for human consumers or by other livestock 314 farms (python, crocodile, fish) (6, 15, (32) (33) (34) (35) . The depopulation behavior can explain why avian influenza 315 viruses of the H5 subtype are more likely isolated from poultry sampled in live bird markets (34, 36, 37 ) 316 than in poultry farms (38) (39) (40) . A case-control study demonstrated that contacts with broiler poultry traders 317 increase the risk of poultry farm infection with H5N1 HPAI in Vietnam (41) while a time series analysis 318 showed the contribution of time variation of trade activity to the seasonality of HPAI H5N1 (28). Spatial 319 analyses conducted in Indonesia and China also showed that proximity to trade networks is a risk factor of 320 H5N1 HPAI reporting (42, 43) . Among factors contributing to infection from trade-based transmission are 321 the high frequency of trader visits to poultry farms and the lack of cleaning and disinfection of traders' 322 vehicles and equipment. Viral amplification in the trade networks may also occur when poultry from 323 different farms are mixed together at the trader's house or in live bird markets (44), an effect not accounted 324 for in the present study. To the best of our knowledge, variation in the timing of sale of infected livestock 325 has not been addressed from a theoretical epidemiological or economic perspective. A previous theoretical 326 model of smallholder poultry farm management in response to avian influenza included sell rate as one of 327 the parameters optimized by farmers but without allowing a differential policy for susceptible and infected 328 poultry, which differs significantly from the present study (16) . 329
Thus the study shows the need to elucidate the respective contribution of trade-based and 330 environmental transmission in the circulation of HPAI to design disease control policies. In the absence of 331 trade-maintained endemicity, the hysteretic property of the system implies that there is an opportunity for 332 social planners (i.e. the state, a livestock farming organization, or an integrating private actor) to 333 significantly improve disease control and, in turn, poultry farmers' welfare. Indeed, temporary costly 334 measures to decrease the FOI (through subsidized mandatory vaccination or poultry mass culling) or to 335 increase the penalty (through sanitary inspections and disease surveillance) may incentivize fast 336 depopulation of infected coops and establish a DFE which is sustained on the long term, provided a small 337 penalty is maintained. Note, however, that mass culling policies applied in outbreak areas, when they are 338 accompanied with financial indemnities, can have the perverse effect of increasing the value of infected 339 flocks and, in turn, disincentivizing depopulation of infected farms and increasing the number of coops with 340
poultry (16). 341
Eradication is not possible when endemicity is maintained through trade. In this case, increasing 342 the penalty, in the absence of affordable vaccine technology, risks simultaneously increasing the FOI and 343 lowering farmer income, leading to lower poultry production and consumption. Here, two options seem 344 reasonable. One is enhancing disease control and/or biosecurity practices in the network of traders. A 345 second is providing farmers with an affordable vaccine technology in order to maintain immunity in poultry 346 populations and decrease the overall FOI. Policymakers may encourage the creation of trustworthy and 347 sustainable certification schemes ensuring that vaccinated birds are sold at higher prices on the open market 348
(45). 349
It was assumed here that farmers aim at maximizing an income flow function in coops populated 350 with poultry. A recent field study suggested that poultry farmers' decision making may be affected by 351 altruistic considerations, risk aversion, time preference, and the influence of other actors in the poultry value 352 chain (15). Farmers are concerned with the welfare of neighboring poultry farmers with whom they have 353 social/family connections. For this reason, they may be more inclined to depopulation than our model 354 predicts, as depopulation would be perceived as reducing local disease transmission. On the other hand, 355 risk aversion may favor vaccination over depopulation. It was shown in Vietnam that poultry farmers 356 cooperate mostly with local feed and chick suppliers to manage poultry diseases, partly because these actors 357 sell feed on credit to farmers, giving them economic influence over their customers (46). Those chick 358 suppliers might perceive the depopulation behavior as advantageous for them as it increases the demand 359 for chicks and limits the local spread of the disease, therefore preserving poultry production in their sale 360
area. 361
The control of avian influenza -on smallholder farms, in markets, and in trading networks -will 362 remain on the global health agenda as long as certain avian influenza subtypes continue exhibiting high 363 mortality in humans. Identifying the origin of these infections and outbreaks is a critical component of their 364
control. Understanding the relationship between the microeconomics of poultry production and 365 microepidemiology of avian influenza transmission will allow us to develop better tools for the control 366 avian influenza outbreaks in smallholder poultry contexts. 
